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It makes one ashamed  that men of our advanced years 
should turn a thing as serious as this into a game. 
     Seneca1 
 
One of Edward’s Mistresses was Jane Shore, who has had  
a play written about her, but it is a tragedy & therefore 
not worth reading. 
Jane Austen2 
 
To Isaiah Berlin, the idea “that all good things must be compatible…and perhaps even entail one 
another in a systematic fashion [is] perhaps one of the least plausible beliefs ever entertained by 
profound and influential thinkers.”3 So says pluralism of monism. The claim is meant to apply as 
much to personal as to political life, and it has led pluralists to argue that monists overlook the 
inescapably tragic dimension of both. If, when values conflict, we cannot turn to a systematic 
theory for guidance, then it seems we have no choice but to compromise and, by compromising, 
diminish what we believe to be good. That, at least, is what comes from negotiation, which is what 
pluralists recommend as the chief alternative to the application of monist theories of morality or 
justice. And they do so even though – or rather because – it means embracing a world that is 
inherently unsystematic, sometimes tragically so.4 
One might push this point even further. Monists do not merely fail to give the tragedy of morals 
or politics its due; some can even be accused of treating them frivolously, as if they were like 
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games. Consider John Rawls’ vision of the “well-ordered society.” To Rawls: “In much the same 
way that players have the shared end to execute a good and fair play of the game, so the members 
of a well-ordered society have the common aim of cooperating together to realize their own and 
another’s nature in ways allowed by the principles of justice.”5 The principles in question are those 
of Rawls’ theory of justice and, just like the rules of a formal game, they are supposed to be 
systematically unified. This comes from meeting three requirements. First, the principles have a 
lexical priority, which means that they are not to be weighed against each other.6 Second, when 
the various liberties asserted by the first principle are to be balanced, we may only do so by 
assessing them as a whole, “as one system.” This means that, much as with utility in utilitarianism, 
there is no sense in which liberty should be sacrificed to the needs of another value; on the contrary, 
it may be compromised “only for the sake of liberty itself.”7 Finally, the second principle is said 
to be the product of a lexically ordered and therefore systematic combination of two others: fair 
equality of opportunity, and a “difference principle” by which inequalities are permitted only when 
they benefit the people in society who are the worst off.8 All this means that, just like a sports 
referee or umpire, no one charged with applying Rawls’ theory should ever be troubled by having 
to make tragic compromises. For the systematic ordering of its principles will, ostensibly, allow 
them to keep their hands clean.9 
Yet are we right to define Rawls’ approach as monistic? After all, as he himself came to see, it 
is relevant to politics alone, and then only in a very specific, “reasonable” sense. Part of what 
Rawls means by this derives from his famous distinction between “comprehensive” and strictly 
“political” conceptions. The former is a view of life that, whether monist, pluralist, or something 
                                                 
     5 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, rev. ed.), p. 462; see also Political 
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005, exp. ed.), p. 204. Others refer to chess, camping trips, or 
swimming races: Nicolas Denyer, “Chess and Life: The Structure of a Moral Code,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 82, no. 1 (June 1982): 59–68; G.A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 
chs. 1–2; and Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 287–
89, 309, 371. Cohen, it should be said, identifies himself as a pluralist in his Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 4–6; on p. 37 of the later book, however, his position is agnostic between 
pluralism and the monism that would be realised if, as he hopes, the principles underlying camping trips were fully 
compatible with each other. 
     6 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 37–39. 
     7 Ibid., pp. 178–79; see also p. 214. 
     8 See ibid., § 13-14. 
     9 See my “Dirty Hands: The One and the Many,” The Monist 101, no. 2 (Apr. 2018): 1–20, pp. 11, 13. 
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else, tends to be believed as metaphysically true, while the latter is a view of justice that “neither 
asserts nor denies” the truth of its principles and judgments. Given this agnosticism, political 
conceptions are understood to be compatible with many different comprehensive views. To which 
it is often added that since, after all this time, we have yet to achieve any sort of consensus on a 
comprehensive view, such metaphysical disagreements may very well be insoluble. But while we 
are unable to reconcile over comprehensive truth, we can still be reasonable and thereby share and 
uphold a political conception.10 
That said, Rawls recognizes that not all comprehensive views will be compatible with a given 
political conception.11 Political homes can nevertheless be made for the reasonable ones, which is 
why he sees his approach as embracing a “reasonable pluralism – as opposed to [the metaphysical 
doctrine of] pluralism as such.”12 And yet, as we have seen, those holding comprehensive views 
are not supposed to inhabit the political as a mere collection of disparate people – on the contrary, 
they are to be governed by a single, unified system. They may still disagree over how to articulate 
and apply its principles (Rawls admits that not everyone may accept his own way of doing so, 
which he calls “justice as fairness”), but the point is that such disagreements will be far less divisive 
than those over, say, morality and, for this reason, they will not threaten well-orderedness.13 
So it is this, the fact that the principles are supposed to fit together in a fully coherent way, 
constituting a oneness, that makes me feel justified in referring to Rawls’ approach as monistic. 
True, it’s only a partial monism, since it is limited to the political, but it’s not as if there is no 
precedent for this sort of thing. Think of Hume, who was downright sceptical about the prospects 
of formulating a unified moral theory while simultaneously being quite ambitious in his political 
theory. Or, stepping back, we can note that while Berlin is a pluralist about the practical he is very 
probably, like Bernard Williams, a monist as regards the natural, for he seems willing to accept 
that it makes sense for scientists to strive for a unified “absolute conception” of nature.14 
                                                 
     10 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 127, 129. Unsurprisingly, Rawls has gone no further than expressing an agnostic 
position as regards comprehensive views’ claims to moral truth, such as when he describes Thomas Nagel’s discussion 
of the “fragmentation of value” as “not implausible.” Ibid., p. 57 n. 10. 
     11 “Any system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some selection must be made from 
the full range of moral and political values that might be realized.” Ibid., p. 57. 
     12 Ibid., p. 129. 
     13 See ibid., pp. 240ff. 
     14 On Hume, see Annette Baier, “Doing without Moral Theory?” in Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and 
Morals (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985). And see Berlin, “The Divorce between the Sciences and 
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The question of philosophical labels aside, it is clear that Rawls believes that a people can be 
united politically while remaining fundamentally divided otherwise, much as the players of a game 
can be said to unite when they agree to conform to the systematically interlocked rules of its 
rulebook. Now while I also happen to oppose pluralism (to me, the right way lies in between it and 
monism), I find it astounding that Rawls would compare just politics to the playing of a game. 
Even more astounding is that, though Rawls appears to be using “game” merely for analogy, the 
reality, as I will argue, is that justice as he conceives of it is a game. 
 
I 
Why do we consider games frivolous? The simple reason is that, except for those who, say, play 
professionally, games normally stand apart from our serious, practical concerns. Practical life is 
(mostly) serious because its values, which form a whole, just matter to us in that way.15 And one 
reason they do so is that the whole cannot be considered unified, since fulfilling practical values 
often requires contending with disorder. Partly this is because, as Samuel Todes once put it, “our 
experience is porous to the blind, dark, and worldless forces that we try to domesticate by bringing 
them into our world so as to make this world habitable and endurable.”16 And partly it is because, 
as pluralists claim, any ordering of that world will always be limited by our inability to systematize 
our values. Hence, once again, Berlin: “The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one 
                                                 
the Humanities,” in Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013, 2nd ed.); Williams, “Consistency and Realism,” in Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 
1956–1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), where he contrasts conflicts of obligations with conflicts 
of belief; and Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 
111–12, 138–40. It is in his Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1978) that Williams 
coins the expression “absolute conception” and, on p. 248 of that book, he makes clear that he is willing to accept its 
viability only as regards natural science. Descartes himself went all the way, which is why when Roland Hall describes 
his ontology as a “partial monism,” given Descartes’ conception of matter but not mind as a unitary substance, it is 
evident that Hall is using the term “monism” in a strictly numerical sense: “Monism and Pluralism,” in Paul Edwards, 
ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 363. Descartes’ belief that all matter 
and mind can be joined into one, thanks to God, means that, in the sense in which I am using the term, his monism is 
anything but partial: The Principles of Philosophy, part I, art. 60, in Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings, 
trans. Desmond M. Clarke (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 135. 
     15 This holism, it’s worth mentioning, is also behind why we consider the things we encounter in our practical lives 
as real – including, of course, those things that we do not experience directly (for we sense that our visual field, say, 
continues on behind our backs). See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Film and the New Psychology,” in Sense and Non-
Sense, trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 
51.  
     16 Todes, Body and World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), p. 58.  
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in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the 
realisation of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others.”17 
So we can see why, in order to play a game, we need to step out of – some might say “leap 
from” – the practical.18 Games stand apart, that is, because they are independent from practical life 
as a whole, and because, at least when it comes to formal games, they are fundamentally ordered 
in a way that the practical is not. Of course the degree of this apartness varies; games in antiquity, 
for example, were viewed as much less autonomous activities. The ancient Greeks never affirmed 
anything like the division between competitive sport and practical life that we, or at least most of 
us, do today.19 In fact some of them virtually collapsed the two altogether. It is because Homer 
saw war as much like athletics that he used the term “grievous” to refer to both battles and sports.20 
And while Plato obviously preferred philosophical over military struggles, he also seems to have 
thought of at least the former as a kind of game.21 Not that everyone can play it; still, everyone 
should spend their lives playing “the noblest possible games” since, as Plato has his Athenian 
Stranger declare, 
 
I assert that what is serious should be treated seriously, and what is not serious should 
not, and that by nature god is worthy of a complete, blessed seriousness, but that what 
is human, as we said earlier, has been devised as a certain plaything of god, and that 
this is really the best thing about it.22  
                                                 
     17 Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Liberty, pp. 213–14. 
     18 See Erik H. Erikson, Toys and Reasons: Stages in the Ritualization of Experience (New York: Norton, 1977), p. 
17. 
     19 On their attitudes, see Michael B. Poliakoff, Combat Sports in the Ancient World: Competition, Violence, and 
Culture (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1987), ch. 6. 
     20 See E. Norman Gardiner, Athletics of the Ancient World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), pp. 19–22. However 
in so doing Homer, and Nietzsche following him, confuse combatants with mere contestants, competitors, those who 
struggle within a unity. See Nietzsche, “Homer’s Contest,” in On the Genealogy of Morality, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, 
trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 2nd ed.). The Hebrew Bible, by contrast, looks 
with disfavour upon those who fail to uphold the difference, as when it describes the Philistines as using the term for 
“to play” or “to make sport” (lesakhek, קֵח ַׂשְל) to refer to a fight to the death. See Judges 16:25–27, which some interpret 
as portraying Samson as having to fight wild animals for the Philistines’ amusement. This is one reason why we might 
say that, unlike the Homeric poems, the Hebrew Bible is meant to be taken seriously. For others, see Erich Auerbach, 
Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003 [1946]), ch. 1.  
     21 See, for example, Republic 487B–C. 
     22 The Laws of Plato, trans. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 803C. 
 6 
Most ancient Greeks surely did not go this far, however, which is why we may assume that they 
were aware of how game playing is an activity that must be to some degree circumscribed, forming 
an “island” of fun amidst the seriousness of the practical. Indeed, there seems to be something 
virtually primordial about the idea; playgrounds, after all, are almost invariably marked off.23 
Getting a grasp of precisely how games stand apart from the practical can be tricky, however. 
While it is true that games are inherently unproductive, property may still change hands between 
players. So we can expect gamblers, at least, to complain that Johan Huizinga goes too far when 
he suggests that games can serve no material interest.24 Still, to play a game is not per se to create 
wealth of any kind, because while some people may certainly play for a living, whatever 
remuneration they receive is best understood as coming from outside of the game. I base this on a 
fundamental distinction: between the ends that are internal to a game, on the one hand, and those 
which, being situated in practical life, are external to it, on the other. This accounts for why, even 
though games are inherently unserious, we can still choose to take them more or less seriously. 
Think of ice hockey. Those who play it professionally have good reasons to be sober about it, since 
it serves as a source of both income and recognition. We might say something similar about its 
fans – at least in a country like Canada, where the game has long claimed a place as an important 
pastime, such that a great deal of national pride has become wrapped up in it. But while values 
such as earning a living, gaining recognition, and upholding national pastimes can all be associated 
with ice hockey, thereby making it serious by connecting it to practical life, they all nevertheless 
remain external to the game. Because the only ends one needs to fulfill to actually play it are those 
such as scoring goals, making saves, and so on. These, then, are internal, since they can be affirmed 
                                                 
     23 As the historian Johan Huizinga, in particular, has emphasized in Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in 
Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), esp. pp. 4, 8–9; see also Georg Simmel, Fundamental Problems of Society 
(Individual and Society), in The Sociology of Georg Simmel, ed. and trans. Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe, IL: The Free 
Press, 1950), pp. 42–43. Erving Goffman, however, refuses to accept that games stand apart from our practical social 
encounters, since he believes that both aim for the same thing, namely “euphoria.” See Goffman, “Fun in Games,” in 
Encounters: Two Studies in the Sociology of Interaction (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961). But this is to ignore 
Aristotle’s warning against confusing happiness or well-being with the enjoyment that can come from playing games: 
Nichomachean Ethics 1176b–1177a. 
     24 See Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p. 9. Roger Caillois, in particular, has complained of how Huizinga’s definition of 
games would force us to exclude bets and games of chance: Man, Play, and Games, trans. Meyer Barash (New York: 
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 5. 
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for no other reason than that they make playing the game possible. And that is precisely why our 
attitude towards them can be playful rather than serious.25 
Kurt Riezler evidently sees what is going on here. As he writes, when it comes to playing (for 
fun), 
 
we are partly concerned but without linking this partial concern to other parts or to the 
whole of our concern. It does not count. In severing the link that connects this part 
with other parts we treat a “partial” concern as if it were no part of anything. Thus the 
part, not being conceived of as part, is not a part. In the seriousness of ordinary life all 
partial concern remains partial because it is connected with some of or all our other 
concerns. The “merely” in our playing seems to point not to a partial concern, but to a 
distinction in which our concern in playing is separated from our other concerns.26 
 
Such playing, in other words, is different from the serious activities of practical life. The latter 
reflect concerns that are parts of practical life as a whole, whereas to play is to stand, to a degree, 
apart from that whole. This division is reinforced by the fact that unlike with, say, the need to 
work, players are supposed to be wholly free to enter the game − to take the leap − or not. Indeed 
the freedom of players to choose to play is essential to one sense (the contractualist) of the idea of 
fair play: if people agree to play a game, then they can be said to have chosen to impose its rules 
on themselves and so they should respect those rules.27 All of which is to say that the more players 
play not simply because of a “love of the game” (“amateur,” it’s worth noting, comes from the 
Latin amare, “to love”), but because they are driven by values external to it, those which are 
situated in practical life – indeed the more those values are seen to influence the game in any way 
                                                 
     25 My way of distinguishing between internal and external goods thus differs from Alasdair MacIntyre’s in his 
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2007, 3rd ed.), pp. 187–91. 
To me, goods that are strictly internal to given practices are “aesthetic” because, just like those internal to games, they 
are independent of the goods of practical life as a whole. 
     26 Riezler, “Play and Seriousness,” Journal of Philosophy 38, no. 19 (Sept. 1941): 505–17, p. 511. 
     27 See Heather Sheridan, “Conceptualising ‘Fair Play’: A Review of the Literature,” European Physical Education 
Review 9, no. 2 (2003): 163–84, pp. 170–72. It is worth pointing out that the idea of fair play is of relatively recent 
vintage, it having originated with the crystallisation of certain crude and dangerous sports into ball games with defined 
rules that took place within the public schools of Victorian Britain. See Charles Tennyson, “They Taught the World 
to Play,” Victorian Studies 2, no. 3 (March 1959): 211–22, p. 212. Of course, this was part of a much deeper and more 
widespread development. See Charles Taylor’s discussion of “the rise of the disciplinary society” in his A Secular 
Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), ch. 2, parts 2–5. 
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– then the more people will worry that the spirit of the game has been undermined. And the less 
fun will it be to play it. 
The distinction between games and practical life also depends, I have claimed, upon the degree 
of formality: the more formal the game, the sharper the distinction. Think of a man who is willing 
to do no more than informally “play around” with a woman. We say that he does not have serious 
intentions towards her since he is excited by “the chase” and hopes only “to score,” not to form a 
genuine relationship. He wants “to attract her without caring to possess her in the stricter sense,” 
as the author of “The Seducer’s Diary” puts it.28 True, he sees her body as an object which could 
satisfy his sexual urges and so he is to this limited extent serious about her, but he nevertheless 
remains distant from her as a person. Once his desires have been satisfied he wishes to go no 
further; she is to have no connection with the rest of his life. 
The playing of a formal game (ice hockey, chess, and so on) stands even more starkly apart 
from the practical and consists of behaviour that can be considered even less serious. Often, this 
playing is said to take place within a wholly independent order, “a little cosmos of its own.”29 
Whereas the practical dimension as a whole is, as pluralists claim, unsystematizable, formal games 
are governed by what John Searle has called “constitutive rules” and such rules, Searle tells us, 
“come in systems.”30 Among other things this means that, as we have noted, they do not contradict 
each other; if they did then it would become exceedingly difficult to play the game. And yet there 
are many systematically unified practices in our practical lives that we do not consider games: 
think of a recipe for making dinner, or of the procedures that you must follow when applying for 
a professional post. However these things are not done to fulfil some strictly internal end – on the 
contrary, their basic point is the achievement of something (a meal, a job) that is useful to us in 
our practical lives. And so we take them seriously, since they are directly connected to those lives, 
serving as extensions of them. Not so the ends that are internal to a game, and this is precisely why 
we can choose to “take a break” and play it. 
                                                 
     28 Kierkegaard, “The Seducer’s Diary,” in Either/Or: Part I, eds. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987 [1903]), p. 307.  
     29 Riezler, p. 505. 
     30 Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 
p. 36. 
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II 
Thus, games are independent, to a degree, from practical life, since they (i) embody strictly internal 
ends, that is, those which are affirmed for nothing other than the sake of the game. Furthermore, 
(ii) formal games, being governed by systematic rules, are ordered, whereas practical life, as a 
whole, is not. Not that I mean for these two to serve as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for some analytic definition of “game.” I agree with Wittgenstein that the concept is simply not 
definable in this way.31 Still, enough has been said about it that we should be ready for the 
comparison with Rawls’ conception of justice. Taking the conditions in reverse order, I begin by 
noting how, in the first footnote to a very early paper, Rawls tells us that he conceives of social 
practices as systematic: “I use the word ‘practice’ throughout as a sort of technical term meaning 
any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, 
defences, and so on, and which gives the activity its structure. As examples one may think of 
games and rituals, trials and parliaments.”32 Rawls even goes on to illustrate his understanding of 
the nature of social practices by drawing parallels with the behaviour of those who play baseball.33 
Evidently, he believes that such practices are governed by constitutive rules, something that he 
states explicitly in A Theory of Justice when he describes institutions as “a set of constitutive 
conventions. Just as the rules of games do, they specify certain activities and define certain 
actions.”34 Rawls is thus clearly an exponent of what Hubert L. Dreyfus has called “theoretical 
holism,” in which human practices can be spelled out in a theory, “the systematic interrelation of 
distinguishable elements,” precisely because they express unified belief systems.35 
Whence  Rawls’ faith in the project of constructing a theory of justice. Imagine coming upon a 
group of people in a park who are playing a game you have not seen before. You ask about its 
                                                 
     31 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe, R. Rhees, and G.H. von Wright, trans. 
Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968, 3rd ed.), § 66, 68–69, 75–76. For an interesting, if failed, attempt at 
providing an analytic definition, see Bernard Suits, The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia (Peterborough, ON: 
Broadview Press, 2014, 3rd ed.). On why it fails, see Norman Geras, “Games and Meanings,” in Stephen de Wijze, 
Matthew H. Kramer, and Ian Carter, eds., Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice: Themes and Challenges (New 
York: Routledge, 2009).   
     32 Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), p. 20 n. 1. 
     33 Ibid., pp. 37–38.  
     34 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 303.  
     35 Dreyfus, “Holism and Hermeneutics,” in Skillful Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception 
and Action, ed. Mark Wrathall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 129.  
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rules but they say that they have never really formulated them. So you offer to do so yourself, and 
the result leads you to propose reforms, reforms which, after having been tested by the players, 
you then reformulate – moving back and forth between practice and theory in this way until you 
settle upon a complete and systematic rulebook. Now this is precisely how political theorists are 
supposed to carry out the task that Rawls calls “political constructivism”: they are to interpret “the 
great game of politics” in a way that achieves “reflective equilibrium” around a systematic set of 
principles of justice.36 
Rawls also conceives of the ordering of these principles as stable in much the same way that 
the rules of formal games are stable. When he describes his ideal society as well-ordered, he means 
three things: that everyone accepts its principles; that its basic structure satisfies these principles; 
and that people generally comply with them in practice.37 All three, of course, also apply to games 
and their players. There must be a consensus about the rules; the set-up of the game must satisfy 
those rules; and the players must actually comply with them as they play (i.e. they should be neither 
cheats nor spoil-sports). Moreover, just as a “publicly recognized conception of justice establishes 
a shared point of view from which citizens’ claims on society can be adjudicated,”38 so may players 
appeal to a common rulebook − through the neutral referee applying it − in order to determine how 
to play. Only when it comes to justice, that referee will tend to be found sitting on the bench of a 
country’s Supreme Court.39 
The well-ordered society, moreover, is “a system that is in equilibrium,” by which Rawls means 
that it can be considered stable “whenever departures from it, caused say by external disturbances, 
call into play forces within the system that tend to bring it back to this equilibrium state.”40 This, 
                                                 
     36 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 18–19, 42–45; and Political Liberalism, pp. 89–129. The expression “the 
great game of politics” is from Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in The Law of Peoples: with ‘The Idea 
of Public Reason Revisited’ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 140; and Lectures on the History 
of Political Philosophy, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 4. Note that, in 
the former, it appears in scare quotes and, in the latter, it is accompanied by a footnote indicating that the expression 
was the name of a column in the Baltimore Sun in the 1920s and ’30s. 
     37 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, § 69; and Political Liberalism, pp. 35–40.  
     38 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 35. 
     39 See ibid., pp. 231–40. Thus whereas current U.S. chief justice John Roberts would probably not agree with the 
substance of Rawls’ principles, he would concur with the latter’s conception of his role. As Roberts declared during 
his confirmation hearings, “Judges are like umpires.” Quoted in Bruce Weber, “Umpires v. Judges,” New York Times, 
July 12, 2009.     
     40 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 400.  
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too, is just like a game. One of the reasons Rawls loved baseball so much is that he believed its 
rules are in equilibrium: 
 
from the start, the diamond was made just the right size, the pitcher’s mound just the 
right distance from home plate, etc., and this makes possible the marvellous plays, 
such as the double play. The physical layout of the game is perfectly adjusted to the 
human skills it is meant to display and to call into graceful exercise. Whereas, 
basketball, e.g., is constantly (or was then) adjusting its rules to get them in balance.41 
 
So when something happens to upset the balance, there needs to be compensation. Imagine some 
youths are playing street hockey while wearing in-line skates. It begins to rain, making skating 
dangerous, so they remove their skates and continue the game while wearing sneakers. In this way, 
they uphold the basic principles of the game while maintaining its equilibrium. The well-ordered 
society is supposed to react to disturbances in a similar fashion. Say there is a terrorist bombing 
and more attacks are likely. In response, the State strives to increase security while respecting civil 
liberties as much as possible. In this way, the society’s stability depends upon its capacity to return 
to equilibrium. And notice the assumption here: that the challenges to that equilibrium are in no 
sense considered opportunities for progress, for bringing the society to a new and better state 
overall by virtue of transformations arising from the disturbances. There appears to be nothing 
fundamental to be learned about justice from dealing with them; we are, rather, to be guided by 
“non-ideal theory,” which is itself able to present a “reasonably clear picture of what is just” 
because it relies upon the already-developed ideal theory for direction.42 Rawls’ approach, then, is 
that of a “conservative” system rather than a “dissipative” or genuinely complex one; the latter 
dissipates into the environment around it and so may end up transforming its structures instead of 
maintaining them and simply returning to the old equilibrium.43 We see the very same process 
with games. While there are times when players may have to do such things as alter their equipment 
                                                 
     41 Rawls, “The Best of All Games,” Boston Review, 1 March 2008.  
     42 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 216.  
     43 See Grégoire Nicolis and Ilya Prigogine, Exploring Complexity: An Introduction (New York: W.H. Freeman and 
Company, 1989), ch. 2, § 1–2.   
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in order to keep playing, such changes are minimal in that they respect the game’s system of rules, 
which remains fixed (at least during play). 
Evidently, fundamental conflict, the kind that could undermine and transform a system’s order, 
is, just as with a game, excluded from Rawls’ ideal society, his “realistic utopia.”44 But this makes 
me think of the dystopia in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, where to live is, as one character 
describes, “to play the game” – a game that, its Controller boasts, constitutes “the stablest 
equilibrium in history.”45 In fact, much as Huxley’s world is said to have a “Centre” that stands 
apart from the “Savage Reservations” around it,46 Rawls’ “political” society stands apart from the 
various cultures of everyday practical life, those which express comprehensive doctrines. True, in 
A Theory of Justice Rawls says only that the principles governing the former may not be relevant 
to the latter, since they are concerned with “the basic structure of society,” 
 
the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties 
and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation [….meaning that 
they] may not work for the rules and practices of private associations or for those of 
less comprehensive social groups. They may be irrelevant for the various informal 
conventions and customs of everyday life; they may not elucidate the justice, or 
perhaps better, the fairness of voluntary cooperative arrangements or procedures for 
making contractual agreements.47 
 
By the time of Political Liberalism, however, Rawls is clear that his principles are strictly 
“political” and so are to be contrasted with those of comprehensive doctrines. For they are 
 
expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political 
culture of a democratic society. This public culture comprises the political institutions 
of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (including 
those of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and documents that are common 
                                                 
     44 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 12.  
     45 Huxley, Brave New World (London: HarperCollins, 1932), pp. 38, 207. 
     46 Ibid., p. 78.  
     47 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 6, 7.   
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knowledge. Comprehensive doctrines of all kinds – religious, philosophical, and moral 
– belong to what we may call the “background culture” of civil society. This is the 
culture of the social, not of the political. It is the culture of daily life, of its many 
associations: churches and universities, learned and scientific societies, and clubs and 
teams, to mention a few.48 
 
One might object that this says only that the principles of justice are conceptually distinct from 
those of everyday practical life. To be independent in the way that the rules of a game are, these 
principles must uphold ends which, to recall our first condition, are strictly internal: one must be 
able to endorse them for no other reason than what we might describe as a “love of justice.” 
However, Rawls himself tells us that the hazards arising from “our sentiment of justice” are “on a 
par with the hazards of love,”49 a claim which, following his “political, not metaphysical” turn, we 
should interpret as invoking none other than the amateur player’s love of the game. 
So justice, as Rawls has come to conceive of it, is capable of standing alone, hence of being 
neither intrinsically nor instrumentally linked to practical life. He makes clear that there is no 
intrinsic link when he specifies that a political conception is a “freestanding view” which is 
independent of practical life’s comprehensive doctrines and so is something that can be 
“expounded apart from, or without reference to, any such wider background.”50 It works “entirely 
within [its] domain and does not rely on anything outside it.”51 As for an instrumental link, Rawls 
rules this out when he asserts that a political conception is more than just a modus vivendi, more 
than some “social consensus founded on self- or group interests, or on the outcome of political 
bargaining.”52 Because justice must be affirmed “for its own sake”53 and, for this reason, it is just 
like the internal ends of a game. 
As for involvement by citizens in the politics which respects justice as so conceived, Rawls 
distinguishes between how they may come to do so, which he says must be entirely voluntary, and 
                                                 
     48 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 13–14. 
     49 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 502; see also Susan Mendus, “The Importance of Love in Rawls’s Theory of 
Justice,” British Journal of Political Science 29, no. 1 (Jan. 1999): 57–75. 
     50 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 12. 
     51 Ibid., p. 374. 
     52 Ibid., p. 147; see also A Theory of Justice, p. 416. 
     53 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 8; Political Liberalism, pp. 50, 54, 92, 148–49.  
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how they and all other citizens enter and leave the society as a whole, which for theoretical 
purposes he limits to the wholly non-voluntary paths of birth and death.54 To Rawls, “there is no 
political obligation, strictly speaking, for citizens generally.”55 Or, as we might wish to put it here: 
they don’t have to play if they don’t want to. 
So it is no surprise that Rawls appeals to the principles of fair play to explain why those who 
participate in politics must respect his conception of justice as well as comply with the other 
requirements of any special role they play in the polity. In the past, Rawls went much further, 
invoking fair play as the reason why everyone should obey the law, but he has since come to anchor 
this obligation in the “natural duty of justice” instead.56 He has concluded that our political duties 
must be limited to cases of wholly voluntary consent, noting that “we acquire obligations by 
promising and by tacit understandings, and even when we join a game, namely, the obligations to 
play by the rules and to be a good sport.”57 This is why he asserts that, when it comes to respecting 
justice as fairness, as long as the institutions are just and practitioners have voluntarily chosen to 
participate in them, then they should do their fair share as defined by the conception of justice.58 
So while he does say that a legal system based upon the conception will be distinct from other 
associations such as games because of “its comprehensive scope and its regulative powers,”59 the 
difference is ultimately one of degree rather than kind. Think of it this way: even if we vastly 
increased the number and types of possible penalties in ice hockey, as well as replaced the penalty 
box with jail, this would certainly raise the stakes but, at the end of the day, it would remain a 
game. 
Perhaps, then, Rawls and his followers will concede that his well-ordered “political” society is 
a kind of game. They take it very seriously, of course, but then that is because they are not playing; 
rather, they are formulating or defending its rules – which, incidentally, is why they may consider 
its impact upon the world outside it. As Rawls writes:  
                                                 
     54 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 302; and Political Liberalism, p. 12.  
     55 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 98. 
     56 See Rawls, “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play,” in Collected Papers; and A Theory of Justice, p. 302.  
     57 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 97. 
     58 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 96–97. Ronald Dworkin has also called for governments to operate on the 
basis of principles of fair play. See his “Principle, Policy, Procedure,” in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 84–85. 
     59 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 207. 
 15 
We cannot, in general, assess a conception of justice by its distributive role alone, 
however useful this role may be in identifying the concept of justice. We must take 
into account its wider connections; for even though justice has a certain priority, being 
the most important virtue of institutions, it is still true that, other things being equal, 
one conception of justice is preferable to another when its broader consequences are 
more desirable.60  
 
That is how Rawlsians reckon with the consequences of their game of justice for ends which are 
external to it. And yet it cannot even be considered on par with what are sometimes called “serious 
games,” those war games, video games, and simulations that are played primarily for purposes, 
not least educational, that lie outside them.61 Since the ends of Rawlsian justice are internal, 
ordinary citizens, as we have seen, are supposed instead to affirm them for their own sakes. 
Moreover, they are (somehow) supposed to do so even when play has had to stop because an 
issue has arisen over the application of the rules. At such times, Rawls would have citizens engage 
in “public reason,” which is a form of deliberation said to be exemplified by none other than the 
Supreme Court justice.62 In a sense, then, they are to become their own referees. And if they ask 
why, Rawls’ answer would surely be, “For the sake of justice,” which also happens to be the 
answer that we should expect to receive if we asked why he formulated and defended his theory 
in the first place. And if we followed this with “Why justice?” then the answer would yet again 
surely be, “For its own sake.” 
All of which leads me to conclude that we should conceive of Rawlsian justice as a form of 
what Susan Sontag has called pure or naïve camp, for it simply does not know itself to be 
                                                 
60 Ibid., p. 6.  
61 See Clark C. Abt, Serious Games (New York: Viking Press, 1970). Rawls is well aware of the educational 
advantages of serious games. During a course lecture about the “reasoning game” (which is how he used to refer to 
“the original position”) he admits that some will object that this is “a kind of frivolous way to think about it: it’s a 
game yet this is supposed to be a very important subject of political philosophy, one where we’re determining how 
society is to be run. Now certainly that’s important – people fight about it all the time and even kill each other on 
occasion – so why talk about it as a game? Only so you won’t get intellectually confused and start asking questions 
that are really irrelevant as it will turn out. It helps to think of very important vital things in terms that reduce the 
emotional involvement.” From “Modern Political Philosophy – Lecture 2,” starting at 28:36.  
      62 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture VI, § 6.  
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unserious.63 It does not recognize how, whereas a game is a game, politics is a fundamentally 
serious, because practical, activity, one that cannot be well-ordered because it takes place in the 
inherently disunified world of human affairs. And from such a world, the threat of tragic moral 
loss cannot be eliminated. 
But so what? How would adopting Rawls’ theory, or one like it, be harmful to political practice? 
Surely this is the important question. My answer is that it can be said to have this effect in two 
ways: one with respect to those who participate directly in politics, and the other as it relates to 
those who do no more than follow it. 
Regarding the practitioners, treating politics as if it were a game encourages them to engage in 
competitive, hence adversarial, behaviour. True, not all games are competitive, but most are, 
competition being virtually their raison d’être, not to mention a large source of the fun. And if 
those involved in politics are faced with a conflict and they see themselves as players in a game, 
then they certainly will compete. This means that they will view each other as not merely 
“opponents” but also “adversaries”: when the basic objective is to defeat a competitor, then one 
can only win if the other loses. The main problem here, as I see it, is that this makes it virtually 
impossible for those involved to respond to their conflict by engaging in conversation, which is an 
extremely fragile mode of dialogue that aims to realize and develop the common good. Those who 
would converse over conflicting values do so because they hope to transform them in a 
reconciliatory way, to devise a solution to the conflict that genuinely benefits all parties. If there 
is the slightest rigidity in thought, however – if we take the “hard line” because we are on the 
defensive, and we are defensive because we sense that we are facing an adversary − then it becomes 
exceedingly difficult for us to undergo the sometimes radical changes that make reconciliation 
possible.64 
Rigidity also derives from a commitment to a previously formulated system of rules, since this 
significantly limits what may be transformed. That limitation is another reason why the citizens 
who would respect Rawls’ theory are almost certain to become adversaries when they conflict. 
Hence the irony in how Ronald Dworkin, another systematic theorist, chose to begin one of his 
                                                 
63 See Sontag, “Notes on ‘Camp’,” in Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux, 1966), nos. 18–19, 22–23. 
     64 For more on the distinction between opponents and adversaries, and on its relevance to dialogue, see my 
“Opponents vs. Adversaries in Plato’s Phaedo,” in Patriotic Elaborations: Essays in Practical Philosophy (Montreal 
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009). 
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books: he calls for shared common ground in a set of political principles that will counter what he, 
along with many others, has come to see as the alarmingly belligerent nature of contemporary U.S. 
politics. To Dworkin, Americans are “no longer partners in self-government; our politics are rather 
a form of war.”65 
Dworkin is not, like Rawls, a monist only with regards to politics. While he agrees that “political 
values are finally unitary, not plural,” his monism also encompasses morality, indeed all of the 
practical.66 Nevertheless he, too, advocates a political vision that is based on two systematically 
interlocked principles. And just as with Rawls’ public reason, Dworkin shares in the belief that we 
require a framework of principles for real argument to be possible. But notice what is meant by 
this: “I mean ‘argument’,” Dworkin writes, “in the old-fashioned sense in which people who share 
some common ground in very basic political principles debate about which concrete politics better 
reflect these shared principles.”67 Now while this certainly is one of the old-fashioned senses of 
the term (parties advance their reasons, “score points” on each other, and hope to win the debate), 
there is also another sense: argument as what is exchanged between the interlocutors of a 
conversation. It also requires that there be things held in common; but they are best understood as 
transformable, value-expressing practices rather than as grounding principles.68 And surely it is 
more of this kind of argument that we need if we’re concerned about an overly adversarial politics. 
Dworkin, however, seems to have room only for competitive debate, which is why, when faced 
with a combative citizenry, he can do no more than insist that “we need to find ways not merely 
to struggle against one another about these issues, as if politics were contact sports.”69 As if politics 
as non-contact sports were acceptable. 
                                                 
     65 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006), p. 1. Or as Rawls laments, “much political debate betrays the marks of warfare.” Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 118. See also James Davison 
Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: Basic Books, 1991); and Hunter, Before the 
Shooting Begins: Searching for Democracy in America’s Culture War (New York: Macmillan, 1994). 
     66 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, p. 155; and see Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs. 
     67 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, p. 5. 
     68 See my From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics: Putting Practice First (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
esp. ch. 3; and my “Patriotic, Not Deliberative, Democracy” and “From Moderate to Extreme Holism,” both in 
Patriotic Elaborations. 
     69 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, p. xi. 
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So we may assume that, just as with Rawls’ justice as fairness, Dworkin’s “partnership 
democracy” is going to be a highly adversarial affair.70 Both theorists’ ideal citizens are indeed 
partners, but only in the sense of those who compete within the same game. Their competition, 
moreover, takes two main forms. The first is associated with those who practice politics as 
members of competing parties or interest groups. And the second arises when such competitions 
have broken down and there are disagreements over what Rawls calls the basic structure of society. 
It seems to me that, at such times, it is Dworkin who has the more realistic sense of what may take 
place. Just as when a game must be suspended because questions have arisen over the application 
of its rules, Dworkin would have the more articulate citizens take on a role comparable to that of 
a team captain and plead their case before the justices of the Supreme Court, the referees. One 
thinks of Dworkin’s many interventions in the New York Review of Books as an example. By 
contrast, Rawls would have citizens somehow switch altogether from competition to cooperation 
and engage in public reason; otherwise put, they are to stop playing and start refereeing.71 That 
there is something schizophrenic about this “dualism”72 should be obvious. What’s less clear is 
why Rawls considers it plausible. But if we follow Dworkin there are at least two reasons why we 
should expect that the pleading he recommends will go on in the adversarial spirit of before. First, 
the tendency of lawyers to advocate positions in the language of rights encourages their conflict to 
be viewed as a “clash of rights” and this is simply too abstract and adversarial to allow for real 
conversation.73 And second, because that is simply how it is done: no self-respecting lawyer today 
ever knowingly pleads in a way that might serve the interests of the opposing side.74 
                                                 
     70 See ibid., pp. 143–47. 
     71 To Dworkin, when it comes to deciding hard cases judges must ask about legislative purposes and underlying 
legal principles, just as referees must ask about the point and character of the game that players have consented to 
play. Notice how those who apply and those who dispute the application of the rules remain separate, in contrast to 
Rawls’ vision. See Dworkin, “Hard Cases,” in Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1978), pp. 101–10; and Rawls, Political Liberalism, ch. 6. 
     72 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xxi. 
     73 As I argue in From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics, ch. 7. On why rights talk of the kind favoured by neutralist liberals 
is inappropriate even for negotiation, see Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New 
York: Macmillan, 1991). 
     74 On the overly adversarial nature of the criminal law, see my “The Scales of Injustice,” Windsor Yearbook of 
Access to Justice 26, no. 1 (2008): 1–24. See also the example offered by Carol Gilligan in her In a Different Voice: 
Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, 2nd ed.), p. 135. 
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Furthermore, we can also assume that, at least on occasion, what is done will be – and I say this 
without exaggeration – immoral. For there is something about systematically rule-based contexts 
that encourages those within them to act in morally questionable ways – as long, that is, as they 
comply with the rules. Arthur Isak Applbaum has put the point as follows: 
 
Deception and violence are presumptive moral wrongs, but the rules of the game of 
poker permit deception, and the rules of boxing, football, and hockey permit violence. 
It is widely believed that lying in poker and tackling in football are morally 
permissible, and this is so because the rules of the games of poker and football permit 
such actions. Similarly, it is widely believed that the permissive rules of professional 
games such as lawyering, business management, and elective politics generate moral 
permissions to engage in deceptive and coercive tactics that, if not for their game 
permissibility, would be morally wrong.75  
 
Applbaum, however, fails to see that this points to a problem with the very idea of conceiving of 
these professions as games; indeed, he even goes on to construct an (albeit highly restrictive) 
argument based on fair play so he can justify certain immoral but rule-respecting behaviours in 
public and professional life.76 
I want to turn now to how treating politics as a game can have a detrimental effect on those who 
follow it. To begin, we need to distinguish between spectators, on the one hand, and the members 
of an audience, on the other. Spectators are individuals who are independent of, fundamentally 
untouched by, whatever they are watching, since they treat it as no more than a source of 
entertainment, as a spectacle. An audience, by contrast, is a communal entity, since its members 
are concerned with how what’s transpiring may affect their common good. Instead of allowing 
themselves to get “carried away” and appreciate events purely aesthetically, then, audience 
                                                 
     75 Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), p. 114. See also David Light Shields and Brenda Light Bredemeier, “Moral Development 
and Behavior in Sport,” in Robert N. Singer, Heather A. Hausenblas, and Christopher M. Janelle, eds., Handbook of 
Sport Psychology (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2001, 2nd ed.), esp. pp. 592–93. 
     76 See Applbaum, pp. 121–35.  
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members engage critically, practically, as listening interpreters. And this means that, just as with 
the interlocutors in a conversation, they may have an edifying, transforming experience.77 
Justice as fairness, however, would make a spectacle of politics. For one thing, just as modern 
sports spectators are separate from the players they watch,78 in Rawls’ conception ordinary citizens 
stand apart from those who participate in politics. For another, as with all contests, the 
competitiveness of justice as fairness lends it great entertainment value. It is surely not just the 
“members of an orchestra, or players on a team, or even both teams in a game, [who] should take 
pleasure…in a good performance, or in a good play of the game, one that they will want to 
remember.”79 The joys of spectatorship are also encouraged by the “distance” of citizens from the 
political arena, because it allows them to keep from feeling affected in a deep way. To be so 
affected they would have to engage instead as the members of an audience, and for this it’s 
necessary to emphasize how, while not directly involved, they nevertheless still are so indirectly. 
For example, we might point to the ways in which their conversations about politics deep within 
civil society can influence the State’s agenda.80 Rawls, however, would have citizens keep their 
“personal deliberations and reflections about political questions” ensconced within associations, 
such as churches and universities, that are to make no contribution whatsoever to public discourse 
                                                 
     77 “The primacy of hearing,” Hans-Georg Gadamer has written, “is the basis of the hermeneutical phenomenon.”  
Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1989, 2nd ed.), p. 462. 
Readers may have noticed the affinities between those I am calling “spectators” and “audience members” and those 
who attend what Bertolt Brecht has called “dramatic” and “epic” theatre, respectively. See Brecht on Theatre: The 
Development of an Aesthetic, ed. and trans. John Willett (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), chs. 8, 13, 18, 20, 53–54; 
and “Theatre for Learning,” trans. Edith Anderson, in Carol Martin and Henry Bial, eds., Brecht Sourcebook (New 
York: Routledge, 2000). Gadamer, however, fails to distinguish enough between spectators and audience members 
because he blurs aesthetic and practical, fun and serious forms of play: see Truth and Method, part I, section II.1(A), 
esp. p. 109. Charles Taylor does the same when he writes about how someone experiencing his first live symphony 
concert can be “enraptured not only by the quality of the sound [something aesthetic], which was as he had expected 
quite different from what you get on records, but also by the dialogue between orchestra and audience [something 
practical].” Taylor, “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate,” in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 191. Finally, Jeffrey Edward Green overlooks the distinction altogether given 
his focus on political engagement with one’s “eyes” in contrast to one’s “voice”: The Eyes of the People: Democracy 
in an Age of Spectatorship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).    
     78 “One facet of [modern] specialization was the separation of roles that put increasingly skilful players on the field 
and increasingly unpracticed spectators on the sidelines.” Allen Guttmann, Sports Spectators (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), p. 83. 
     79 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 204. 
     80 As I do when I argue that we should never draw a solid line between the citizens in civil society and state agents: 
see From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics, ch. 5; and “Patriotic, Not Deliberative, Democracy,” p. 39. 
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about “constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.”81 (Unless, presumably, one happens 
to be a professor publishing in defence of political liberalism.) 
It is worth mentioning that citizens as audience members may still find aspects of politics 
entertaining, not least because attempts at political conversation, whether theirs or politicians’, will 
often break down and so will have to make way for negotiation, which is adversarial and not merely 
oppositional. Nor should we overlook the necessarily competitive nature of elections. That said, 
these citizens’ critical attitudes should keep them from getting carried away into “the aesthetic”. It 
will do so, however, only if they manage to avoid the “horse race coverage” of so much 
contemporary political journalism, whose unrelenting focus on strategy, polls, scandals, and other 
forms of infotainment has ensured that politics as spectacle virtually rules the day.82 Regardless, 
the point I wish to make here is simply that adopting justice as fairness, or any other such theory, 
will serve only to further entrench that rule. 
Treating politics as a game can also affect citizens by sapping what Rawls would call the 
“strength”83 of their sense of justice, thus undermining a major source of his regime’s stability. 
Justice as fairness, in other words, subverts itself. Riezler’s statement above about how play stands 
apart from our ordinary practical concerns suggests why: when objects are disconnected from 
practical life then we may still care for them, of course, but no more so than we care for mere 
games. Sometimes, it goes without saying, game-playing can elicit real passion, but this will 
always be qualitatively different from the truly deep-seated sense of commitment that we feel 
towards whatever is important to us in our practical lives. This makes sense since, as Dreyfus has 
pointed out, “in so far as games work by temporarily capturing our imaginations in limited 
domains, they cannot simulate serious commitments in the real world.”84 One reason for this 
inability is that, as we have seen, when values are contained within a unity such as a systematic 
set of rules they will appear to be sheltered from risk, since there can be no fundamental conflict 
between them. And just as overprotective parenting undermines the child, when there is no danger 
                                                 
     81 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 215. 
     82 See Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), ch. 5; 
James R. Compton, The Integrated News Spectacle: A Political Economy of Cultural Performance (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2004); and Frank Brettschneider, “Horse Race Coverage,” in Wolfgang Donsbach, ed., The International 
Encyclopedia of Communication, vol. 5 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008).  
     83 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 142; and A Theory of Justice, pp. 436–38.  
     84 Dreyfus, On the Internet (New York: Routledge, 2009, 2nd ed.), p. 87.  
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that we might have to get our hands dirty by compromising our values then our sense of 
commitment to them gets weakened. In fact, as Kierkegaard long ago suggested, a loss of 
commitment is the fate of all spectators, all those whom he identifies as members of “the public”: 
 
that abstract aggregate ridiculously formed by the participant’s becoming a third 
party. That sluggish crowd which understands nothing itself and is unwilling to do 
anything, that gallery-public [which] now seeks to be entertained and indulges in 
the notion that everything anyone does is done so that it may have something to 
gossip about.85  
 
Rawls should expect nothing less from the citizens who follow his “political” politics as if they 
were watching a game. 
 
III 
One reason why pluralists, or at least the value pluralists that interest me here, cannot be accused 
of treating politics as a game is that they never see it as standing apart from practical life. In 
pluralism, politics cannot, without distortion, be made subject to a unified system of rules; nor can 
it be independent, since the negotiations that pluralists recommend are at least partly instrumental 
to the values being defended, and these values are fundamentally practical.  
The negotiations are only partly instrumental because they are also premised on the virtue of 
toleration, so those involved are expected to make concessions, and not simply because they have 
been unable to find a way to eliminate their adversaries. As I interpret pluralists, they endorse 
toleration because they recognize that, since people are often brought up to affirm different values, 
it is not their “fault” if their values conflict with yours; they are no less moral agents than you are. 
In consequence, you should view their positions as morally legitimate and so worthy of a certain 
minimum of respect.86 At the same time, toleration remains just one value among many, so you 
                                                 
     85 Kierkegaard, “The Present Age,” in Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age, A Literary Review, 
eds. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 94. 
     86 This contrasts with Dworkin. Regarding specifically international politics, he admits that “we must take pluralism 
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Because rather than being driven by toleration, we are to view the positions of those we are negotiating with as 
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should not affirm it uncompromisingly. Thus, despite referring to “fairness” in his argument for 
why conflict resolution should consist in negotiation, Stuart Hampshire means something very 
different by the term than does Rawls. Instead of the fairness of the neutral referee applying 
systematically unified rules or principles, Hampshire wants to invoke something disunified, “the 
kind of imperfect fairness that may emerge from procedures which are themselves compromises, 
from the relics of history.”87  
And yet, by giving primacy to negotiation, pluralists can be accused of taking politics too 
seriously. As we’ve already seen, a politics formed purely of negotiation and compromise is going 
to be a dirty, and often tragic, affair. For it to be otherwise there must be room for not only the 
accommodations of negotiation but also the reconciliations that conversation sometimes makes 
possible. Only then can we speak of a politics that is not only tragic but also comic, since 
reconciliation is, after all, the central goal of comedy: as the literary theorist Northrop Frye once 
put it, “the theme of the comic is the integration of society.”88 Of course, social integration is a 
serious practical business, but, as everyone knows, comedy goes hand in hand with humour. So 
we can expect a politics that is comic to have at least some playful elements sprinkled upon its 
surface. Such a politics, in other words, can be serious without also being solemn. 
Integration, we should note, requires that there already be some integration to begin with. This 
means that citizens and their representatives must see themselves as sharing a common good (even 
if they happen to disagree about its meaning). Only when they are members of a political 
community, when they are friends of a civic sort, can they stand to each other as opponents who 
are not also adversaries and so have a conversation about what their common good requires. 
Pluralism, however, ultimately has room for only a fragmented, because plural, society: for a 
multiplicity of partial groupings that “clash” when their interests conflict.89 This explains the 
pluralist’s assumption that conflict is necessarily adversarial, that people can, at best, respond by 
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putting pressure on each other as part of a struggle to reach a balanced accommodation. 
Conversation is ruled out not only because there is nothing in common to talk about, but also 
because it is hard to feel secure enough to listen with an open mind when you are being confronted 
with a demand, with the threat that you will have to give up something important. 
The irony here is that pluralists, by encouraging us to take politics too seriously, would bring 
many of the same problems that come from treating it as a game. For one thing, the absence of 
conversation means there will be little to learn. More, perhaps, than might come from playing 
politics, since negotiation at least requires us to clarify how we should rank and weight our values 
against our adversary’s demands. As negotiators we might also discover the tactics that will 
produce the concessions we desire. But all this is far from the sometimes profound learning that 
can come from engaging in genuine conversation, which is about developing a sense of the deeper 
meanings that our values can have for us. That sense is a prerequisite for transforming those values 
and reconciling the conflict; we need to learn about their proper place in the whole, in the common 
good that we share with our fellow citizens. 
We do so from within a context of genuine diversity. Diversity, however, is to a significant 
degree absent from the fragmented world of pluralism. Here’s why. Diversity is distinct from mere 
plurality, understood as the multiplicity of absolutely different things that, having no relation to 
things outside of themselves, are different only in terms of themselves. It was Hegel who argued 
that if something “is not itself but its other” then it must be “different from difference [and so a 
form of] identity.”90 Purely different things, in other words, are ultimately uniform. Not that all 
pluralists conceive of difference in this way; for some, to say that values are often 
“incommensurable” with each other is still to accept that they are rationally comparable, despite 
the inability to capture them within a unified theory.91 According to Berlin and Williams, for 
example, when there is a conflict between values it is obviously untrue to hold that “reason has 
nothing to say (i.e. there is nothing reasonable to be said) about which should prevail over the 
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other.”92 This can only be so because it is being assumed that the values can be compared against 
a shared background, “the general pattern of life in which we believe.”93 Nevertheless, assuming 
that there is always more than one “we” when it comes to conflict, Berlin and Williams must allow 
that some values may share little to nothing with others and so come close to being absolutely 
different. In consequence, even their pluralism can be said to limit diversity, returning us to the 
idea that there will be little point in listening to the people we are in conflict with since we can 
expect them to aim for no more than extracting concessions, not learning through shared 
understanding. 
Another problem with pluralism is that its politics can easily become unsustainable, since the 
appeal to tolerance may simply not be robust enough to maintain good-faith negotiations. When 
negotiators are faced with a plurality of values they will almost inevitably get the sense that others 
are justifying their positions by selectively choosing from whichever values happen to be most 
beneficial to them in a given context – cherry-picking their morality, essentially. This feeling can 
only breed cynicism and undermine good faith. And when pluralist politics gives way to 
Realpolitik, then parties will negotiate not because they willingly tolerate each other but because 
they are too weak to do otherwise. The only way to avoid this and so sustain a culture of good 
faith, then, is to come to the negotiations from failed conversations over the common good. After 
all, there is a world of difference between negotiating with a (civic) friend, on the one hand, and 
with a “natural enemy,”94 on the other. 
Another reason why pluralist politics is unsustainable is that it saps our commitment to our 
values. Pluralists are well aware of one form this takes, since they themselves recommend it. I am 
thinking of their repeated calls for balance and moderation, which are only to be expected since 
the willingness to compromise is essential to successful negotiation. But they completely miss the 
other form, which is due to a feature of their philosophy of language. To pluralists, values lay 
claim to two dimensions of meaning: one is contextual, in which values are present in conflicting 
situations with other values; another is abstract, in which a value’s core is said to exist as isolated 
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and (often) universal.95 Pluralists sometimes see it as part of their job to supply definitions of these 
cores, since they assume that the resulting clarity will help us with the practical reasoning we need 
for negotiating value conflicts as they arise. Berlin, for example, writes of the need “to isolate the 
pure ore of egalitarianism proper,” or to prevent whatever “monstrous impersonation” or “sleight 
of hand” is facilitated by the “confusion” or “confounding” of liberty with other values.96 Yet 
perhaps the most purely abstract articulations of values are, he suggests, provided by the leaders 
of oppressed groups, individuals whose “noble eloquence” is especially evident when 
 
for a brief instant their utterance has a universal quality...The formal possession of 
power is unfavourable to that truly disinterested eloquence – disinterested partly at 
least because fulfilment is remote, because principles shine forth most clearly in the 
darkness and void, because the inner vision is still free from the confusions and 
obscurities, the compromises and blurred outlines of the external world inevitably 
forced upon it by the beginnings of practical action.97 
 
Presumably, this is when values are at their most powerful, and are most able to motivate us to 
uphold them, because they have yet to undergo the compromises forced upon them by conflicts 
with other values in practical contexts. So it is when they are in this abstract state that we might 
expect their supporters to be the most committed to them. 
The reality is quite the opposite, however. When it comes to abstractions, our commitments 
tend to be fickle at best, volatile at worst. Berlin’s intellectual hero, Alexander Herzen, was well 
aware of the latter, which accounts for Berlin’s description of him as having a deep distrust of 
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the great, official historical goals ‒ progress, liberty, equality, national unity, 
historic rights, human solidarity ‒ principles and slogans in the name of which men 
had been, and doubtless would soon again be, violated and slaughtered, and their 
forms of life condemned and destroyed….Herzen saw danger in the great 
magnificent abstractions the mere sound of which precipitated men into violent and 
meaningless slaughter ‒ new idols, it seemed to him, on whose altars human blood 
was to be shed tomorrow as irrationally and uselessly as the blood of the victims of 
yesterday or the day before, sacrificed in honour of older divinities ‒ Church or 
monarchy or the feudal order or the sacred customs of the tribe, that were now 
discredited as obstacles to the progress of mankind. [Thus did Herzen exhibit] 
scepticism about the meaning and value of abstract ideals as such, in contrast with 
the concrete, short-term, immediate goals of identifiable living individuals.98  
 
Berlin evidently does not follow Herzen all the way here, as we can see from his analytic work of 
mining the “pure ore” of moral concepts. Nevertheless, both can be said to miss how, over the long 
term, the abstract articulation of values is a form of aestheticization; by converting the values into 
simulacra, it serves only to undermine them. To repeat the Kierkegaardian point, deep commitment 
is ultimately a matter of presence in practical contexts, where values are connected to each other 
within a practical whole. Hence Dreyfus: “it is a fundamental and strange characteristic of our 
lives that insofar as we turn our most personal concerns into objects, which we can study and 
choose, they no longer have a grip on us.”99 This is not really so strange, however, because we all 
know (or at least should know) that the more abstract a value’s articulation is, the more distant it 
will be from our practical concerns, the things that really matter to us. A cursory reading of major 
speeches by the leaders of oppressed groups thus shows us right away that the power of their 
eloquence derives not from their disinterestedness but from how they articulate values in 
particularistic rather than abstract terms. Think of Louis Riel’s final statement at his treason trial 
in Regina, 1885; of Theodor Herzl’s address to the First Zionist Congress in Basel, 1897; of Martin 
Luther King Jr.’s “I Have A Dream” speech at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, 1963; or of 
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Nelson Mandela’s “I Am Prepared to Die” statement from the dock in front of the Pretoria Supreme 
Court, 1964.100 In each case, these leaders expressed agendas for action that took full account of 
the practical realities. 
Perhaps one reason why pluralists, with their often tragic view of politics, end up relegating the 
isolated cores of values to the “darkness and void” is that, otherwise, the values risk becoming 
comic. In fact, there exists a whole genre of dramatic comedy based around what E.M. Forster has 
called “flat” characters, those which are dominated by a lone quality of mind or mood – what Ben 
Jonson, in keeping with the Renaissance psychology of his time, labelled a “humour.”101 Such 
dominance can produce an exaggeration effect which makes the character into a caricature that we 
find funny. However, instead of welcoming this as the basis of a form of moral or political satire 
(one that highlights the need to transform the value in question so that it may be reconciled with 
others), pluralists maintain their belief in the static purity of a value’s core. As a result, they limit 
any change to the tragic compromising of negotiation and, in consequence, they end up with a 
politics that remains all too serious. 
 
IV  
A political philosophy which favours reconciliation over the application of a systematic theory of 
justice, and over the struggle for balanced accommodation, is one that offers a path between the 
extremes of monism and pluralism. It calls on citizens to put their common good first by 
responding to conflicts with conversation. Because when a conversation succeeds, it brings both 
integration, hence progress towards unity, and the kind of shared understanding that respects 
difference and so diversity.102 When successful, this approach can be said to move us “towards 
One, as Many,” something which is only possible within a holistic, but not unified, practical 
context. At the same time, the practical should not be considered so alien from the aesthetic that 
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we fail to see the presence within the former of aesthetic structural forms such as comedy and 
tragedy. Likewise, the internal ends of the aesthetic dimension can be indirectly connected to other, 
practical ones situated outside of it. 
Still, we must never forget that these two dimensions are not only irreducible but also, on 
occasion, incompatible. Sometimes, no more than a permeable border lies between them; but 
sometimes, it is an abyss. Evidently, I want to see if the latter can sometimes be lessened. This 
makes the approach I am recommending very different from not only the pluralists, but also those 
who emphasize how the abyss must forever “flash” in and out of existence. I am thinking of those 
difference philosophers who are best understood as advocating not movement towards unity but 
rather a paradoxical affirmation of both the One and the Many, together.103 Often, they begin with 
the observation that the logic of monism (or “metaphysics”) leads it to expand “the game” beyond 
all limits. One response, that of Jean-François Lyotard, is to express incredulity towards the very 
idea of such a single “metanarrative” and to affirm, alongside this alternative metanarrative of 
incredulity, a plurality of (language) games.104 Chantal Mouffe, for her part, advocates an agonistic 
democracy which assumes a consensus over certain ethico-political principles while 
acknowledging that these same principles exist through a multiplicity of diverging interpretations 
of them. This “conflictual consensus,” she says, should be considered a “mixed-game,” since it is 
partly collaborative and partly conflictual.105 By contrast, Jacques Derrida, at least in his early 
writings, believes that “play is always lost when it seeks salvation in games,” and so he favours a 
deconstruction that would make way for an originary “freeplay” instead, one that both accepts the 
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constraints of “presence,” such as the structures constituted by a game’s rules, and disrupts them.106 
Yet this seems to amount to more or less the same thing: an ironic attitude of the kind upheld by 
those who, as Richard Rorty recommends, are “never quite able to take themselves seriously.”107 
Note the “quite” here, which establishes the sort of ambiguity that comes from recognizing 
something as being not so much a matter of degree as of all or nothing – and yet also, somehow, 
both.  
What we have here, I suggest, is very much like the “attitude of throwing off constraint” that 
characterizes those forms of play beloved of children and improvisational performers.108 But if its 
universalization leads you to contend, like the melancholy Jaques, that “all the world’s a stage, 
and all the men and women merely players,”109 then I will object. Because we are more than just 
players, and to claim otherwise is to contribute, perhaps even more so than Rawls, to the 
aestheticization of our lives. There is a reason why “play” has been central to aesthetics since at 
least Kant and Schiller, and it suggests that the very same disinterested stance required for 
appreciating beauty for its own sake is also involved in playing according to rules for their own 
sake, that is, in playing games. But as a number of social critics have complained, aestheticization 
has already gone far enough.110 To which I would add that we need to see how it is accompanied 
by a kind of “Gnostic threat”: by refusing the seriousness of life, we are led to view the whole 
world as unreal. And when that happens, then, as the nihilist saying goes, anything is possible. 
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Perhaps I am overstating the danger. We can be sure of one thing, however: conversation is 
incompatible with such widespread aestheticization. Conversation requires earnest interlocutors, 
the kind that take their subjects seriously. And yet the obstacles to conversing are many and real, 
which is why those of us who would give it a place in politics need to recognize how frequently it 
will fail, leaving negotiation as the next best option. This means that politics will indeed often have 
to be a tragic, rather than comic, affair. Still, at least we may be said to have given both tragedy 
and comedy their due, and so to have taken politics with just the right amount of seriousness. 
